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Abstract 
Abstract: A dramatic decline in aggregate output volatility in China from central 
planning to market-oriented reforms in the past half century is documented in this 
paper The output volatility measured by the standard deviation of real gross 
domestic product (GDP) growth over the specified rolling windows declined by 73% 
from 1953-1977 to 1978—2008. The sharpest reduction occurred in 1978 when China 
began to initiate a series ofmarket reforms. Since the inception of these reforms the 
volatility continued to decline, dropping more than 30% from 1978-1994 to 1995-
2008 During the planning period, the co-movements in the provincial output, which 
reflected the systemic risks associated with the highly centralized economic and 
political systems in China, were found to be the primary source of the high output 
volatility During the subsequent economic transition, a new set offactors, including 
the volatile population shares, inflation volatility, foreign direct investment (FDI) 
and private shares in total fixed investment, contributed significantly to the continued 
output volatility reduction, 
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The long and persistent economic growth in the post-World War II period, 
which is usually referred to as the "Golden Age", along with the economic prosperity 
it brought, started the dream of attaining a perpetually high economic growth. The 
economic success ofJapan was followed by the rise of four Asian economies, known 
as the Asian Tigers. As a natural result of the high economic growth, the living 
standards in these countries improved substantially. However, China, a country with 
an economy that had been ruined by years of warfare and economic and political 
chaos, was highly impoverished at the time. Many Chinese were at the edge of 
starvation before its economic growth took off. In fact, the famine in China during 
1958-1961, which was caused by both intense weather and political mishaps, had 
been the most critical in modem human h i s t o r y � N o t long after the great famine, the 
Cultural Revolution, swept throughout the continent. The Cultural Revolution caused 
nearly 10 years ofpolitical turbulence in the 1970s, ending only in the latter part of 
the decade. Starting from the late 1970s when China fmally ended the political chaos, 
the biggest developing country initiated a series of market-oriented reforms. After 
nearly 30 years of economic reforms and transition, the economy of China not just 
recovered from the serious economic damages, but it achieved startling success, with 
a gross domestic product (GDP) growth that averages 9.8 percent annually. With the 
help of successful economic reforms, China obtained the status it sought, and maybe, 
even much more than it had originally expected. China is now characterized by a 
perpetually high economic growth. Significant researches and discussions have been 
made to summarize the valuable experience of China in its pursuit of economic 
success. However, attention has been rarely given to the change in the trend of 
business cycle volatility in China vis-a-vis its pursuit of economic prosperity. 
Without the mute of the destructive cycles, continuous economic growth can't be 
maintained. China's continuously high economic growth stands on the grave o f t h e 
huge "ups and downs" it had suffered before the reforms. 
In particular, studies investigating the relatively long term trend of business 
cycle volatility and its determinants are rather n e w l Examining the long-term trend 
‘See Li and Yang (2005), Houser, Sands and Xiao (2009), etc. . , _ . , , 
2 See Kim and Nelson (1999), McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000), Blanchard and Simon (2001), 
Ahmed, Levin, and Wilson (2004), Dynan, Elmendorfand Sichel (2006), Davis and Kahn (2008), 
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of business cycle volatility in China is the rational next-step in understanding its 
continuous economic prosperity, but this subject matter has not been tackled 
previously^ This paper chronicles the output volatility of China which is at least as 
interesting as about its output growth. A remarkable reduction in output volatility in 
China has been observed for more than 50 years. We have collected China's real 
GDP data during the period from 1952 to 2009 from China Data Online, a database 
which is authorized by National Bureau of Statistics. The database provides detailed 
national account data for China over a very long time span. The facts that were 
discovered by analyzing the data are striking. The output volatility measured by the 
rolling window standard deviation of real GDP growth declined 73% from 1953-
1977 to 1978-2008 and it declined more than 30% from 1978-1994 to 1995-2008. In 
actuality, the volatility-free central planning economy，at least in the viewpoint of 
Marxism, encountered ^ c h more output volatility than the period when China 
started its transition toward a market economy. The Chinese economy has 
experienced two phases of large output volatility reduction. The first phase is more 
dramatic, whose timing coincides with the time when China started its market 
reforms in the late 1970s. Moreover, compared with the second phase, wherein the 
reduction in output volatility was continuous and gradual, the reduction in output 
volatility reduction in the first phase is more of a sudden drop. The second phase of 
output reduction began when China introduced its market reforms in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s. The decline in output volatility continued in a gradual yet 
significant way. 
On the other hand, the decline in volatility is also significant in different sectors 
as well as across different expenditure categories in China. For instance, from 1978-
1994 to 1995-2008, the volatility of f ixed capital investment decreased by 59%, and 
the volatility ofhousehold consumption also more than halved. 
The rest o f th is paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, the related literature 
is briefly review; Data for education, employment, financial and other measures 
besides the GDP and general price series, both on the provincial and national level 
were collected. Our provincial data cover 29 provinces in China. With the data set, 
we examine the basic characteristics of the output volatility in China from 1952 to 
jaimovich and Siu (2009), and Benati and Surico (2009) among others, which were classified as the 
"Great Moderation" literature. 
3 Some researchers note a substantial reduction in output volatility since the middle ofthe 1990s 
(Brandt and Zhu 2000 and 2001; Gong and Lin 2008; He et al. 2009) 
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2009 in Section 3. A more detailed description about our data set is provided in 
Section 3.1. The sharpest decline in output volatility occurred when China began to 
transition away from central planning. Then the declining trend then continued in the 
30 years that followed. The reduction in GDP volatility was also decomposed into its 
components to understand the volatility moderation in China further. In addition, we 
test whether the compositional change that shifted from the primary industry to the 
secondary industry and tertiary industry could account for the moderation and, i fyes , 
to what extent did it account for. 
As mentioned in the introduction, the two phases of output volatility feature 
unique characteristics that should be analyzed differently. The fact that China 
utilized the central planning method in its economy before 1978 is undisputed. The 
impact o f t h e dramatic regime shift that occurred in 1978 should be addressed. Thus, 
we adopt different analytic framework to the discussions of the two phases of output 
volatility reduction. In Section 4, the provinces-national time series system that 
explains the sharpest drop in output volatility in the 1970s is estimated; In Section 5, 
panel regression methodology is implemented to investigate what has driven the 
gradual reduction of output volatility since the late 1970s and the early 1980s. 
Substantial differences in market structures o f t h e central planning economy and the 
market economy create latent problems if the data before and after 1978 are pooled 
together. Thus, the sample period was restricted to 1980-2007. In Section 6, the 
conclusion is presented. 
2. Literature Review 
To the best of our knowledge, studies devoted directly to analyzing output 
volatility reduction in China are limited. Only the working paper by Zhang and 
Zhang (2010) has discussed the matter. Zhang and Zhang provided a highly detailed 
analysis on the trend of the volatility of the GDP series in China along with its 
components. Using the quarterly GDP data during 1978-2009, they find a statistically 
significant break in the variance o f t h e GDP series in 1993. They also document the 
secular change in the characteristics o f t h e volatility series of employment, the Total 
Factor Productivity (TFP), the expenditure GDP components and the provincial GDP 
growth. 
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On the other hand, studies that are not directly related with China's output 
reduction but share the most similarities are researches about the trend ofbus iness 
cycle volatility for most industrialized countries after the 1980s. Output volatility in 
these countries declined dramatically from the 1980s, a phenomenon which was 
referred to as the “Great Moderation" in the literature^ Most advanced economies, 
such as the US, its fellow members in the G7 and many other industrialized countries, 
experienced a dramatic reduction in volatility of aggregate economic activities. 
Volatility reduction is evident for output and employment at the aggregate level and 
across most industrial sectors and expenditure categories. Inflation level and inflation 
volatility have also declined dramatically. For instance, the volatility of GDP, total 
goods production, durables-goods consumption and production, total investment, 
residential investment, construction output, and imports declined sharply in the mid-
1980s in the US (Stock and Watson, 2002). The question remains as to whether and 
to what extent this broad phenomenon is related to and shares common features with 
the output volatility reduction we observed in China. The methods used in the ‘‘Great 
Moderation" serve as valuable references in this paper. 
The earliest analysis of the volatility reduction is an unpublished internal 
memorandum at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System written by 
two staff economists (Gilchrist and Kashyap, 1990) whose daily job is to track the 
U.S. economy. In academic journals, the first published studies that identified 
moderation in volatility were that of Kim and Nelson (1999) and McConnell and 
Perez-Quiros (2000). Later on, Blanchard and Simon (2001), Jaimovich and Siu 
(2009) find evidence of similar reduction in output volatility in other industrialized 
countries, such as the members of G7 countries. Japan is the only possible exception 
because it has actually experienced an increase in output volatility after the l " O s 5 . 
Inspired by the seminal papers there have been extensive researches on the reduction 
ofvolatility many published in leadingjoumals^ There is much less doubt or dispute 
4 See Kim and Nelson (1999)，McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000)，Blanchard andSimon (2001) 
Stock and Watson (2002), Ahmed, Levin, and Wilson (2004), Beck, Lundberg and Majnoni (2006) 
Dynan, Elmendorfand Sichel (2006)，Davis and Kahn (2008)，Jaimovich and Siu (2009)，and Benati 
and Surico (2009), among others. ^ ^ . , . . , , 
5 The exception, however, might offer clues in understanding the reasons behmd the widespread 
volatility moderation. 
6 See Ahmed, Levin, and Wilson (2004), Dynan, Elmendorfand Sichel (2006), Davis and Kahn 
(2008), Jaimovich and Siu (2009), and Benati and Surico (2009)，among others. 
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about the existence of the reduction in output volatility7 than on whether the sharp 
decline in volatility is a sudden brake (McConnell and Perez-Quiros, 2000) or a 
continuous trend (Blanchard and Simon, 2001) as well as on the reasons' behind 
such a sharp decline. The two fields of discussions are inevitably interrelated. The 
explanations behind this moderation depend on whether it was a brake or a trend. For 
instance, if it were a brake, it should be more reasonable to search for events 
happening around the date of the brake. Meanwhile, the main reasons behind the 
moderation would determine whether it happened as a brake or as a continuous trend. 
If the moderation were the result of a once-and-for-all structural change in the 
economy toward a more stable one, it would be more likely that a brake in the output 
volatility would be observed. 
One o f the reasons why output volatility moderation is interesting to study is that 
lowered volatility leads to longer expansion even though the expansion only has a 
^ d e m t e magnitude. As alleged by Blanchard and Simon (2001), the large decrease 
in the standard deviation of output shocks is at the root of the two long expansions 
the United States has recently experienced. The growth effect of the reduction in 
volatility can be the results of pure statistical measurement or may possibly come 
from the more complicated resources, such as a reduced systematic risk in the 
economy. The searching for the actual mechanism on how reduction in output 
volatility can enhance economic growth may induce new researches. The other 
important reason behind the increasing research interest in studying the output 
moderation is that, to a certain extent, it challenges the conventional wisdom 
regarding the relationship among ^ n e t a r y policy, inflation and output volatility. As 
in the standard economic models, monetary policymakers can reduce the volatility of 
inflation only by allowing greater volatility in the output growth in the long run 
(Bemanke 2004). However, during the Great Moderation in the US, both inflation 
volatility and output volatility fell dramatically. The standard deviation of GDP 
growth has nearly halved and inflation volatility has more than halved from 1960:1-
1979:4 to 1984:l-2002:l(Ahmed, Levin, and Wilson, 2002). Blanchard and Simon 
(2001) and Jaimovich and Siu (2009) both find a significant positive relationship 
7 The financial crisis in 2008 may complicate the matter given that highly significant fluctuations 
happened after most ofthe papers had been written. Whether including additional data from 2008 
onwards will affect the results remains unknown. . 
8 See Stock and Watson (2002), Ahmed, Levin, and Wilson (2004), Dynan, Elmendorfand Sichel 
(2006), Davis and Kahn (2008), Jaimovich and Siu (2009), Benati and Sunco (2009), etc. 
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between output volatility and inflation volatility in the panel regressions in their 
studies using G7 countries. 
On the other hand, as Bemanke (2004) remarks in his discussion of the Great 
Moderation:"Explanations ofcomplicated phenomena are rarely clear cut and simple, 
and each...probably contains elements of truth." It is hardly untrue as changes and 
transitions happened in the past quarter century largely exceed what happened in the 
past several centuries. The continuous globalization, the internationally division of 
labor and specialization, the lowering of economic and political barriers to 
international trade and finance, the unprecedented improvement in technology may 
have all contributed to the shift in the way economy operates. To a certain extent, 
research on the global output moderation is only a small portion in the studies about 
the new economies that emerged in the past decades. 
2.1. Interpretation of the Output Moderation 
An obvious result of the sharp reduction in output volatility is the longer 
expansions and shorter and milder recessions. The US experienced only two 
relatively mild recessions since 1984, compared with four recessions—two of them 
quite deep--in the fifteen years before 1984. According to the monthly business cycle 
chronology of the National Bureau of Economic Research, which covers the period 
since the Civil War, the 120-month expansion of the 1990s was the longest 
recession-free period the US has enjoyed, and the 92-month expansion o f t h e 1980s 
was the third longest of such period (Bemanke, 2004). The low volatility period in 
China was also the period China enjoyed high economic growth'’ This is especially 
easy to understand if the volatility is measured with the standard deviation of the 
economic growth rate. Less volatility is equal to less deviation from the mean growth 
rate, which is generally positive. Therefore, less volatility and longer expansions are 
the two sides of the same coin. 
The second interpretation is somewhat more economic oriented. If the output 
volatility partially measures both the exogenous and endogenous systematic shocks 
to the economy, the moderation o f t h e volatility reduces the risk people face. People 
can reduce individual risks through adequate diversification but can not reduce the 
9 The volatility and mean growth series ofreal GDP in Figure 2 are highly negatively correlated (-
0.78). 
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systematic risks by diversification. The decline in economy-wide risks thus can be 
welfare-improving. For consumers, they should be better off even i f t h e y enjoy the 
same amount of consumption (in fact, they don't) because there's less uncertainty 
given people are risk-averse. For firms, they should be better off when there's less 
uncertainty in the economy. It is possible that they might be able to spend fewer 
resources in risk management and invest more in R&D. Therefore they can benefit 
from the productivity gain. It is also possible that as fluctuation in demand stabilizes 
firms need to keep fewer inventories to meet their orders. So they can benefit from 
the reduced capital expenditure. However, Davis and Kahn (2008) show that the 
xnircro story is in fact more of a mixture. The evidence on individual earnings 
uncertainty points to a longer-term rise, not a decline though the average volatility of 
firm-level employment growth fell after the mid-1980s (Davis, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, 
and Miranda, 2007). 
The third interpretation is that the output volatility reduction reflects the 
increasing ability of people to manage risk. The role financial innovations possibly 
play in the moderation is similar to this interpretation. A key change in financial 
intermediation has been improved assessment and pricing of risk (Dynan’ Elmendorf, 
and Sichel 2006). The easing of access of households and firms to credit would 
improve their ability to deal with exogenous shocks. The inventory hypothesis o f t h e 
Great Moderation that ascribes the output volatility reduction to better management 
practices (McConnell and Perez-Quiros, 2000) is also o f th i s kind. The variance of 
inventory investment and the covariance ofinventory investment, as well as the final 
sales, show a substantial downward trend. The inventory-sales ratio for all the 
durables goods trends downwards for nearly two decades after peaking in the years 
1982-83 (Davis and Kahn, 2008)�. 
Lastly, the inflation volatility declined at the same time as the output volatility. 
If inflation is considered to be the price signal distortion, less inflation volatility 
means that forecasting inflation and the prices ofgoods and assets is relatively easier. 
As a consequence, it may be reasonable to think that the distortion caused by 
inflation can mitigate. If the price is more predictable because of less inflation 
volatility, the efficiency of the economy is expected to improve. 
7 
3. Reduction of Output Volatility in China 
3.1. Data Description 
The GDP of China and its components data are obtained from China Data 
Online, a database authorized by National Bureau of Statistics. Chinese University of 
Hong Kong library has purchased the rights to access this database. The database has 
comprehensive statistics of China both on the national and into the provincial level. 
Our national nominal GDP and its components decomposed by income approach and 
expenditure approach data start from 1949 to 2009. Our price indices include; 
General Retail Price Index (RPI), General Consumer Price Index (CPI) and Implied 
GDP Deflator (GDPD). Implied GDP Deflator is calculated by combining the 
information on nominal GDP data and their indices. Several revisions o f the national 
account data by the Chinese Statistical Bureau exist, particularly the significant 
revision in 2004 using data from the economic census. The data used are accounted 
for in the revisions. Data on education, employment and financial measures etc. are 
also gathered from China Data Online. The provincial data set includes 29 provinces 
in China i.e. Anhui, Beijing, Fujian, Gansu, Guangdong, Guangxi, Guizhou, Hainan, 
Hebei, Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Inner Mongolia, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Jilin, 
Liaoning, Ningxia, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Shandong, Shanghai, Shanxi, Sichuan, Tianjin, 
Xinjiang, Yunan, Zhejiang. Chongqing and Tibet are excluded for data consistency. 
3.2. Basic Statistical Analysis 
As a starting point, we employ several simple statistical methods to analyze the 
basic features o f t h e output volatility series in China. In Figure 1, the raw series for 
real GDP growth over the period from 1953 to 2008 is plotted. The ups-and-downs 
before 1980s are frequent and large in scale, when the drop in output growth in 1961 
reached 31 percent. The 7-year rolling window standard deviation and the mean of 
annual real GDP growth by income approach are plotted in Figure 2. The first 
observation available for the GDP growth is 1953, and so the first observation for the 
standard deviation and mean of the growth rate is 1956. The existence of a dramatic 
reduction in output volatility in China is obvious and clear. The volatility of GDP 
growth dropped from a flat peak in 1960s to a historical low in 1977. After the sharp 
8 
drop in the late 1970s, the output volatility continued to trend down over time except 
for a mild up-side deviation from the declining trend in the 1990s. If a similar figure 
is plotted for the volatility of consumer spending, capital formation and government 
spending, a highly similar pattern would be observed (see Figure 3 and Figure 4 ) . 
There's one drop in the volatility of capital formation in 1997. From 1994 to 2000, 
the capital formation only had one-digit growth. In 1997 there was only 1% increase 
m capital formation. However, during both the period 1991-1993 and from 2001 on, 
capital formation always had two-digit growth. The 1993 growth of capital formation 
is as high as 35%. Despite this drop in the volatility of capital formation, the 
volatility of all three series exhibited a similar long term decline. The huge volatility 
in the 1960s and 70s disappeared. In Figure 4, as the magnitude of consumer 
spending volatility is much smaller, we change the scale for consumer spending to 
the right axis in order to enhance the comparison between the trends of the three 
series. The mild increase in volatility for GDP series in the 1990s tumed out to be 
substantial for consumer spending. In fact, it is even bigger than the fluctuation in the 
1960s.The trend in the mean of GDP growth, however, is different. It was more 
volatile during the 1960s and 1970s and shifted to a rising track after 1977. It then 
remained at a relatively stable high level. 
Surprisingly, during the central planning era in China, roughly speaking years 
before 1978, the output volatility was ^ d i larger than in the later period when more 
market mechanisms were introduced. In the conventional frame-of-thought'\ plans 
set by the central planner in the central planning economy to balance demand and 
supply, though may be inefficient, can at least maintain reasonable consistency and 
thus lead to a low volatility. Nevertheless, our empirical results suggest that such 
man-made plans would result in more volatility as opposed to reducing it. 
[Insert Figure 1 here； 
[Insert Figure 2 here； 
[Insert Figure 3 here； 
[Insert Figure 4 here； 
10 The investigation ofthe potential relationship between the components ofincome approach GDP 
and expenditure approach is beyond this paper. 
11 At least with regard to the popular frame-of-thought in Marx, era when central planning was 
commonly used. 
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To the best o f o u r knowledge, there's hardly any the best guidance in the choice 
o f t h e length ofrol l ing window. As a robustness check, a figure similar to Figure 2 is 
plotted using a rolling window o f f i v e years instead of seven (See Figure 5). Across 
either specification, the results are robust. 
Insert Figure 5 here] 
The rolling window standard deviation is one popular and standard way to 
measure volatility. But one can think ofother ways. One alternative is to consider the 
standard deviation of an output gap, for instance, first difference between the levels 
of the logarithm of output, a Hodrick-Prescott-filtered series or a Baxter-King-
filtered series. These alternatives will not change the basic results. 
It is generally assumed that output time series data have a trend component and 
potentially several volatile components ofdifferent frequencies. Different detrending 
methods may provide us with the volatile series ofdifferent frequencies. As a result, 
the measured volatility may differ, although not necessarily so. The results of the 
volatility reduction calculated by using different detrending methods are presented in 
Table 1. Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter is one o f t h e standard tools used in removing 
the trend of time series. Recent work of Ravn，and Uhlig (2002) show that the 
appropriate value of the smooth parameter is 6.25 for annual data when isolating 
fluctuations at the traditional business cycle frequencies (those higher than eight 
years) while a smoothing parameter of 100 is used in ^ c h of the macroeconomics 
literature. We report the results for both choices. We also use the band-pass-filter 
proposed by Baxter and King to isolate fluctuations between two and eights years in 
frequency. In addition, we consider real output detrended by first-differencing which 
amplifies high-frequency fluctuations relative to HP filter. This detrending method is 
used by Kim and Nelson (1999) and McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000). 
The reduction in output volatility from 1955-1977 to 1978-2006 is around 75% 
regardless of the employed detrending method. The reduction in output volatility 
from 1978-1994 to 1995-2006 is approximately 65% for three methods we have 
considered. Though the reduction in output volatility measure by HPlOO is much 
lower to be less than 40%, it is still largely considerable. 
[Insert Table 1 here； 
While the simple graph analysis already revealed facts that are ofsignificant interest, 
a more structural method can be used. Now, we may go one step tother by 
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investigating in details the process generating the output movement observed in 
Figure 2. 
The large drop in output volatility leads to an interesting question whether this 
reduction in output volatility is a sudden brake or a declining trend as inquired in the 
literature. As a first cut, we regress the real GDP growth rate on a constant and a time 
trend. The time trend is negative and insignificant. This insignificance of the trend 
term is robust to the use of the first difference of GDP growth rather than the level, 
as well as to the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable. According to McCormell 
and Perez-Quiros (2000), this insignificance is a preliminary evidence of instability 
in the mean GDP growth rate. Besides, we forther test the existence of such a 
structural brake in the GDP series. Before proceeding to the statistical test, we first 
present some candidates for the brake dates. The evolution of the Chinese economy 
suggests several possible periods ofrapid shift in economic structure that will likely 
cause the structural breaks in the GDP series: 1978-1980 when the Cultural 
Revolution ended and China started to transform from a central planning economy to 
a market economy; 1992 to 1994 when Deng visited the southern part of China and 
then afterward, the special economic zones were set up in south China and 
substantial reforms were introduced to the tax and foreign exchange system. This 
allows us to perform the standard Chow test for the break points^^ First, we fit the 
GDP growth series with an AR(1) process and then use the Chow test to test a break 
point in 1980 and 1994 jointly. The null hypothesis of no break point can be rejected 
at the 5% confidential level (See Table 2). 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Aside from dealing with the question ofwhether a break point exists in the series, 
we also detect whether the change was in the standard deviation of output shocks or 
in the dynamic process. We use Blanchard and Simon's (2001) method to examine 
whether the lower volatility of the output reflects a lower standard deviation of 
output shocks or a change in the dynamic process through which these shocks affect 
output or both. We use the AR(1)^' process to fit the real GDP series. An 
12 Perez-Quiros (2000) provided sophisticated econometric methods in testing the existence ofabreak 
in the GDP volatile series. Zhang and Zhang (2010) demonstrated a highly detailed test using 
quarterly GDP data during 1978-2009 for the breaks in the mean GDP growth rate, the volatility of 
GDP growth rate and the different GDP subcomponents. They did find a significant brake in the 
volatility ofGDP growth in 1993. 
13 McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000) and Blanchard and Simon (2001) also use a AR(1) setting. 
11 
interpretation o f t h e AR(1) modeling is that it uses the most up-to-date information, 
that is 4^ 卜1 to make inference about A_y,，given that we are restricted to the 
univariate case. Suppose that we have no way of knowing whether the series is 
martingale, then adding more lags would potentially improve the estimate in 
theoryi4at the cost ofparsimoniousness. Here we do not argue that AR(1) is a best fit 
but AR(1) at least provides the simplest yet efficient way to use the information. In 
particular we estimate the following equation: 
^y^-g = a{L\^y,_,-g)^e, 
where 3；, denotes the logarithm of output in year t，g is the underlying growth rate of 
output, a n d � i s a white-noise shock with standard deviation a , . We estimate the 
equation over a rolling sample from 1949 onwards with a window of twenty years. If 
the reason the generating process was modified is due to a change in the dynamic, a 
clear change in the trend of the coefficient is expected; if the reason the generating 
process was ^ d i f i e d is due to a lower standard deviation of shocks, a reduction in 
the standard deviation of the residual is expect. 
The key parameters and its two standard deviation upper and lower bound are 
reported in Figure 6 and Figure 7. 
[Insert Figure 6 here] 
[Insert Figure 7 here] 
The estimated AR coefficient has a wide confident interval, which indicates that 
the persistence of shocks may have changed. On one hand, the estimated mean 
growth rate has a significantly large standard deviation at the beginning, which is 
consistent with the above observed large volatility in that period. On the other hand, 
since the 1980s, the estimated implicit growth rate began to undergo a continuous 
and significant increase. The timing of this increase coincided with the policy of 
China to open up, as well as the introduction of its economic transformation. The 
result is consistent with the fact that China experienced an unprecedented economic 
boom during the period. 
14 weattempted to add more lags. Most ofthe lags were insignificant and only improved the 
estimation marginally. On the other hand, to foster comparison with previous literature, we consider 
that AR(1) provides a better trade-off. 
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3.3. Decomposition of the Reduction in Volatility 
Insert Table 3 here； 
Volatility reduction, as found in the great moderation literature, is evident across 
different industrial sectors and expenditure categories. In Table 3, we calculate the 
standard deviation ofdifferent GDP components from the income approach and from 
the expenditure approach in China using two different break years. These two years 
are chosen due to the prior information about the historical events that happened at 
that time, which are considered critical to the economic performance. The year 1978-
1980 marked the ending o f t h e chaotic Cultural Revolution as well as the time China 
started its economic transition; the year 1992-1994 marked the starting point of a 
series of substantial reforms and China's transition accelerated. Our Chow test in 
Section 3.2 lends further support for the choice from the data themselves. We also try 
different selections o f t h e break years as robustness checks. The obtained results are 
not sensitive to the choices o f the break years. A considerable drop is observed in the 
standard deviation across all income and expenditure categories. By income 
approach the volatility o f G D P growth dropped 73% from 1953-1977 to 1978-2008. 
Even considering only the lowest possible value in Table 3, the standard deviation of 
GDP growth rate also decreased more than thirty percent from 1978-1991 to 1992-
2008 using expenditure GDP. The reduction in volatility in components of GDP is 
also just as striking. From 1978-1991 to 1992-2008, the volatility of consumer 
spending more than halved. The volatility of secondary industry output dropped 
more than seventy percent from 1953-1977 to 1978-2008. 
3.4. Compositional Change 
To account for the large reduction in volatility, a natural conjecture is that the 
shift in share between industries may explain a number of portions of the output 
volatility decrease, especially in a transitional economy and developing country like 
China. According to Figure 8，the output share of different industrial sectors has 
experienced gradual yet dramatic change over the time period that is of interest to 
this research. In 1978，the output in primary industry output accounted for 
approximately 30% o f t h e overall GDP, whereas in 2009, it has reduced to a little 
more than 10%. On the other hand, the cyclical sensitivity does differ across different 
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industrial sectors. For example, Bums (1960) and Moore and Zamowitz (1986) 
suggested that the service sector is less cyclically sensitive than the manufacturing 
sector in the US. To evaluate this hypothesis on the sectoral shift, we perform a 
counterfactual practice. We calculate the counterfactual standard deviation of GDP 
growth assuming that the fraction o f t h e sectoral share was at the 1978,s level or at 
the 1994's level. This practice suggests that the shift in GDP composition shift has a 
negligible effect on the volatility reduction. The results are summarized in Table 4. 
The magnitudes of the reduction in volatility are almost identical whether the 
counterfactual fixed share or the factual changing share is applied. To do this 
exercise, the growth of GDP is decomposed into the growth of its component. F, is 
real GDP at time t and X , is ith component of GDP, in real terms, then: 
l^.=I^. 
i 
We can write the rate of output growth to be 
M - ^ v M i L = y ^ ^ 
l^"rZT"/ >^M 4l 
where ^ is the rate of growth of ith component and ^ is the share of ith 
Z"-i ‘1 
compent. So we are able to calculate the counterfactual series as follows by assuming 
^ to stay at its 1978 level ^ ^ or 1994 level ^ ： 
y >^ 978 1^994 
/一且 
f ^ y 9 7 8 y ^ ^ . f ^ f ^ y i m . ^ 
U r j ~ / 1^978 ^ , V - l ' U M j 丨 1^994 ; M 
[Insert Figure 8 here] 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
The reason behind the results in Table 4 is clear in Figure 9 and Figure 10. In 
Figure 9 and Figure 10, the three industries experience the same trend of output 
volatility reduction. This is why autonomously fixing the output shares of the 
different sectors yields essentially the same decline in the standard deviation o f G D P 
growth as using the actual, changing shares. 
[Insert Figure 9 here] 
Insert Figure 10 here] 
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4. Output Volatility Drop from Central-planning to Economic 
transition 
The previous sections document the general characteristics of the output 
volatility reduction in China during a period ofmore than 50 years. In the subsequent 
sections, a more in detail analysis will be conducted on the sudden drop of output 
volatility in the late 1970s, which is one of our main interests. Although it happened 
to be that 1970s was a period with very high volatility for many countries besides 
China (Blanchard and Simon, 2001), reasons behind the common high volatility of 
China and those other countries are likely to be diverse. The effect of the world-wide 
supply shocks in 1970s to China's output volatility may possibly be limited as China 
at that time was rather segmented from the rest o f t h e world. From a historical point 
ofview, what has happened from late 1960s to the early 1970s in China was unique. 
One may expect that those historical events were the reasons behind the huge 
fluctuations. The Great Leap Forward, the three-years natural disaster and the 
Cultural Revolution happened during this period may have played an important role. 
Nevertheless, without the following mechanism their effect would be limited. 
One way to think o f the Great Leap Forward, the three-years natural disaster and 
the Cultural Revolution is to consider them as large national level negative output 
shocks, largely exogenous to the ec0n0myi5. ^he national real GDP growth in 1961, 
1967 and 1976 was -27%, -8% and -3% respectively (See Figure 1). First, it may be 
that negative political shocks were more often in a central economy. Second, given 
the same shocks, the output drop in a central economy may be huge. There is hardly 
any good ways to evaluate the first possibility. However, some evidences for the 
second possibility are found in this paper. Hypothetically, when the national level 
negative output shocks transmit to provincial level output fluctuations, the effect on 
provincial level output becomes magnified as a result of the highly centralized 
economic system. The economic reforms introduced in the late 1970s and the early 
1980s eliminate the channel that generated large output volatility. The decrease in 
systematic risk due to central planning policy mistakes and the increase in provincial 
independence in response to national negative shocks are the primary explanations 
15 Consider political shocks as exogenous. 
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that account for the dramatic decline in output volatility in China from 1960s to the 
late 1970s. 
We estimated a provinces-national time-series system of annual GDP series to 
describe output growth dependence o f t h e provinces on national shocks and to assess 
the hypothesis described above.. First, we use GARCH(0,1) at the national level to 
obtain the national idiosyncratic shocks � , . H e s s and Iwata (1997) i%d McConnell 
and Perez-Quiros (2000) to ^ d d log difference of rea l GDP as an AR(1) process^l 
In Section 3.2, the evidence ofsignificant change in output volatility lends support to 
the use of GARCH model, which explicitly allow change in variance of the series. 
We estimate the ^ d e l using two separate sample periods (before and after 1978), 
The model is specified as follows: 
AVM 二 ^N + h^m-\ + ^Nt, ^Nt � " ( 0 , o i ) 
crln =^N + < V + / ^ " < - i 
where y,! denotes the logarithm of the national output in year t, and � , f o l l o w s a 
normal distribution with mean 0 and variance c r�,. 
We then estimate a similar but ^ d i f i e d GARCH(0,1) at the provincial level. 
We include � a s one regressor to test whether national idiosyncratic shocks had an 
effect on provincial output growth and, if yes, whether the effect had changed before 
and after 1978. Again, we estimate the provincial level ^ d d using two subsample 
periods (before and after 1978). 
Ay, - Mi + 2^^ Ay"-i + ^i^N, + 〜， i^t � • , al) 
o-l =c,.+6>,i + A-a,li 
A number of significantly interesting facts are revealed by solely estimating this 
system. First, the elements in provincial correlation matrix of ^, obtained from the 
provincial estimation before 1978 are ^ s t l y positive and large, whereas after 1978, 
there was an occurrence of negative values, and the magnitude of positive values 
declined. Second, the estimated c o e f f i c i e n t s � a r e significant at 1% before 1978 for 
16 They show that a ARIMA(1,1,0) model is at least as good as the m a y widely u^e^nonlj^ear 
models at replicating the duration and amplitude offluctuations in the log ofreal GDP in the US. 
17 Althoughless economic meanings exist in time series regression than structural cross-section 
regression, it generally produce satisfactory forecasting power. 
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all the provincesi8 whereas 10 out o f 2 7 coefficients become insignificant at 5% after 
1978 and 14 out of 27 coefficients become insignificant at 1% after 1978. The 
significance level of the 26 out of 27 coefficients decreases. The evidence suggests 
that after 1978, the dependence of provinces on the national-level economic 
environment declined. In addition, we can formally test whether the change in the 
estimated coefficients A, is significant or not. A dummy variable D ^ which takes 
value 0 before 1978 and 1 after 1978 is introduced in the following equations. The 
significance of A,, tells whether there exists a structural change in the provincial 
dependence on the national shocks. The estimated coefficient A,, and A, and its t-
statistics are reported in panel A of Table 5 if D ^ only interacts with � , a n d in 
panel B of Table 5 if D ^ are allowed to interacts with more variables. In panel A 
20 out of 27 又丨丫 are significant and in panel B 21 out of 27 2,., are significant. The 
test results strongly suggest that the dependence of provincial output growth on 
national shocks changed before and after 1978. 
Aj;, -/^,. +^Ay,- i+^i^Nt +2,TA978x〜,+〜，〜〜y(0,a, ;) 
crl =c,+6>,_f + A 4 i 
Ay,, 二 " , + a,D,97S + My"-1 + 入丨〜丨 + ^/rA978 X ^m + “ , & � M o , ^ 1 ) 
CJ,$=C,+a2/A978Xf + <^ /f + "'.�;—l 
As a toher exercise, we compute the provincial response function to the 
national shocks (See Figure 11). The toction is calculated using the follcnvmg steps: 
1) all the years with negative 〜，are identified; 2) for every identified year, the ratio 
~ / � i s computed for all the provinces in the current year as well as the years up 
to forward 3^'; and 3) the averages across provinces and across time are taken. The 
provincial response measures the relative response or say co-movement of the 
provinces to national idiosyncratic shocks measured by s^, . By definition, the 
provincial response is independent o f the magnitude ofnational idiosyncratic shocks. 
Based on Figure 11, before 1978, provinces move together and overshoot with 
18 Hainan and Sichuan are excluded from the comparison because their data were missing before 1978. 
19 In Figure 11, 1 on the horizontal axis denotes the current year. 
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national shocks at the current year but move to the opposite direction one year after 
the current year. 
The pattern o f t h e provincial response function completely changes after 1978. 
The provincial response function becomes rather flat. It is generally positive and has 
only modest variation both in the current and the forward years. As robustness 
checks, we also calculate the same provincial response function by choosing s^, to 
be one standard deviation from its mean and by excluding the huge negative shock in 
• 20 
1961. The results obtained are almost identical. 
[Insert Figure 11 here] 
Therefore, a certain "central planning" error overshooting mechanism apparently 
occurred in response to the national idiosyncratic shocks before 1978 and drove 
down all the provincial output by a large margin. Later, at the time of the "central 
planning" system revising the errors, a large rebound in output occurred in the 
following year. To our knowledge, the best possible candidate for such "central 
planning" systematic risk is policy error committed by the central government. There 
is corroborative evidence to support our hypothesis in the related literature that looks 
into the consequence of one particular policy mistake. For instance, Li and Yang 
(2005), among others, show with convincing evidences that for a certain historical 
event, that is, the Great Leap Forward, policy mistakes were the main force that 
drove the grain production down. The grain output collapsed in 1958-1961, which 
decreased by about 35%, and then recovered in 1961-1966. The researchers identify 
that the policy error of diverging resources out of agricultural production and taxing 
excessive procurement was responsible for the observed 61% decline in grain output. 
Figure 11 shows that the mechanism completely disappears after 1978. The 
transition away from central planning eliminates the mechanism that overshoots the 
response in provincial output changes. This occurrence largely explains the sudden 
drop in output volatility we observed in Figure 2 from the 1960s to the late 1970s. 
20 The results are available upon request from the author. 
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5. Output Moderation during the Reform Period 
5.1. Conceptual Framework 
In the previous section, the reason for the sudden slump of output volatility in 
China in the late 1970s was discussed. The following section will focus on a set of 
possible explanations for the gradual trending down of output volatility in China that 
started after 1978 and continued to the present. In general, two broad explanations 
will be explored, namely, the universal explanations that have been used to explain 
the volatility moderation in most industrialized countries after the 1980s and the 
specific explanations which are ofspecial importance for the Chinese economy. 
5.2. General Determinants 
The first explanation is on the improvement of the conduct of monetary policy 
and the good luck (i.e. the smaller exogenous shocks). Our classification differs 
slightly from Stock and Watson (2004) for two reasons. First, the investigation of 
regional economy can not separate effects of the above mentioned two factors. 
Second, both factors can affect inflation and output volatility simutalously'V The 
effect of inflation will be explored in details to reflect the information on and the 
effect o fbo th monetary policy and the good luck. The studies claiming that improved 
monetary policies and practices caused the reduction in volatility include, for 
example Clarida, Cali and Gertler (2000), among others. The studies emphasizing the 
critical role of "good luck" include Stock and Watson (2003) and Benati and 
Surico(2009), among others. Ahmed, Levin, and Wilson (2002) somehow gathered at 
controversial evidence. They utilized both frequency-domain and vector 
autoregression (VAR) to distinguish among competing explanations for the volatility 
reduction whether it is because of improvements in monetary policy, better business 
practices, and a fortuitous reduction in exogenous disturbances. Their frequency-
domain analysis shows that the decline in output variability appears to be evenly 
distributed across frequencies, rather than concentrated at particular frequencies, 
which lends support to the good luck hypothesis. However, their results for inflation 
are inconsistent with good luck being the primary explanation. Their VAR results for 
21 Exogenous shocks, ofcourse, can also affect output volatility directly. 
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inflation are consistent with the view that monetary policy has changed the structure 
o f the economy in such a way as to stabilize inflation over the past two decades. 
The second explanation is generally the influence of demographic change on the 
output volatility. The paper of Jaimovich and Siu (2009) is the seminal paper that 
explores the influence of labor force structure and population structure of an 
economy on output volatility. They document the important differences in the 
responsiveness of labor market activity to the business cycle for individuals of 
different ages. The results are found to be an empirical regularity not only for the US 
but also for all G7 countries. In previous works, Clark and Summers (1981), Rios-
Rull (1996), and Gomme et al. (2005) also show, using postwar US data, that the 
cyclical volatility of market work is U-shaped as a function of age. The young 
experience much greater volatility of employment and hours worked than the prime-
aged over the business cycle; those closer to retirement experience volatility 
somewhere in between. Based on this demographic regularity, Jaimovich and Siu 
(2009) find a significant effect ofchange in the age composition o f the labor force on 
the variation in cyclical volatility in G7 countries by employing a panel-data method. 
In their basic regression, they regress measures of output volatility on volatile labor 
force share, which is defined as the fraction of the 15-64-year-old labor force 
accounted for by those 15-29 and 60-64, controlling for country fixed effect and time 
effect. The effect is identified through cross-country differences in the extent and 
timing of demographic changes. As robustness checks, their results are not changed 
across different measures ofvolatility and detrending methods. They also instrument 
the labor force share variable by population share and further lagged birth rates to 
address the possible endogeneity problem. 
The third explanation is the better business cycle practices - improvement in 
technology and management. One particular explanation attributes the volatility 
reduction to new and better inventory management practices (McConnell, Mosser, 
and Perez-Quiros 1999; McConnell and Perez-Quiros 2000). McConnell, Mosser, 
and Perez-Quiros (1999) find that by weighting each GDP component by its share in 
overall economic growth, inventory investment and consumer spending emerge as 
the chief contributors to the increased stability of the economy since 1984. 
McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000) find a statistically significant break in output 
variability, especially in durables manufacturing, but not in sales variability. Thus, 
2 0 
they conclude that changes in inventory management must account for this 
discrepancy. 
The fourth explanation is provided by Dynan, Elmendorf and Sichel (2006) and 
Beck, Lundberg and Majnoni (2006). Dynan, Elmendorf and Sichel (2006) argue that 
financial innovations, for instance, developments in lending practices and loan 
markets that have enhanced the ability ofhouseholds and firms to borrow should be 
added to the list oflikely contributors to the output moderation. They employ a set of 
simple econometric methods to detect the stabilizing effect of financial innovations. 
The results give support for the stabilizing effect of financial innovations in 
consumer spending and housing investment. The evidence for business fixed 
investment is a mixture. Consensus on the effect offinancing constraints on business 
investment is not reached in the literature. Beck, Lundberg and Majnoni (2006) 
explore whether the level of financial development measured by the private credit 
GDP ratio has a stabilizing effect on economic growth. Their panel regressions using 
63 countries over the period of 1960-1997 suggest that the level of financial 
development plays an insignificant role. However, there is weak evidence showing 
that financial intermediaries dampen the effect ofreal shocks measured by the terms 
of trade volatility and somewhat stronger evidence that financial intermediaries 
magnify the impact ofmonetary shocks measured by inflation volatility in countries 
where firms have little or no access to external finance through capital markets. A 
number of other researches also investigate the relationship between different 
characteristics of financial system and economic growth and volatility as well. 
Levine (1997) summarizes five basic toctions of the financial systems. One ofthese 
functions is to facilitate the trading, hedging, diversifying, and pooling of risk. This 
function induces a natural conjecture that the development of fmancial system in an 
economy will result in a smaller output volatility by enhancing its ability in risk 
management. 
The others studies attribute the grand reason for the output moderation to 
volatility reduction of some particular sectors, for example residential fixed 
investment (McCarthy and Peach, 2002, etc.). 
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5.2.1. China-specific Determinants 
Due to the unique feature of Chinese economy, we provide several alternative 
explanations for the change in output volatilities. 
First, with the implementation of “Nine years of compulsory education" since 
the beginning of 1980s, China experienced a substantial accumulation of human 
capital As the accumulation of human capital can increase the ability of managing 
risks, we conjecture that the store ofhuman capital might be an important factor for 
output volatility in Chinese economy^^. 
Second, similar to the universal hypothesis that financial innovations and 
financial development play a role in volatility moderation, foreign direct investment 
(FDI) is of special importance to China but is less relevant to developed economies 
or other developing countries. China is among the top FDI recipients in the world 
(Prasad and Wei, 2005). FDI can be seen as a form of equity financing in the sense 
that FDI inflows can somehow alleviate the financial constraints (Harrison et. all, 
2004). In addition, FDI is also considered a proxy to measure both the import of 
technological improvement and the progress of economic reforms toward a market 
economy. As a result, FDI may play an indispensible role in determining the output 
volatility of China. 
Third, as revealed in the analysis in Section 4, the central planning effect 
contributes positively to the output volatility. Therefore the level of central planning 
residuals in the institutions possibly plays a role. If it is true that the more state 
government play a role in the economy, the more volatile the economy would be. 
Then the progress in the market transition would be important in affecting output 
volatility of China. In this study, we look into the effect of state entities share and 
private share in Total Investment in Fixed Asset on output volatility. Brandt and Zhu 
(2000) show that the government's commitment in state sector and directing fund 
through credit plan and credit control to the state sector contribute to the growth and 
inflation cycles China undergone during the reforms. 
22 The importance ofhuman capital to economic growth has been a focus of researches since Lucus 
(1988). x L continuing accumulation ofhuman capital will trigger the endogenous econom|C g r o ^ 
however litter is known whether the accumulation ofhuman capital can also reduce growth volatility 
andwhether, at least, part ofthe contribution ofhuman capital accumulation to the economic growth 
could be done by reducing output volatility. 
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5.3. Panel Regression 
We believe that all of the previously mentioned factors assume certain roles. 
Possibly, the most important factors of the output moderation are even still missing 
in the literature. Although all the explanations we reviewed previously that 
economists expected to account for the great moderation of output volatility may still 
be a partial set, the effort to integrate the effects o f t h e different factors above would 
be worth-exerting as a preliminary attempt,. We use a panel fixed effect model that 
was first used in Blanchard and Simon (2001) and later in Jaimovich and Siu (2009). 
Our analysis focus on five sets of explanations out o f t h e many mentioned in Section 
5.1: the improvement of macroeconomic policy and good luck, the employment, 
labor force and population structure, human capital measured by the student-teacher 
ratio, financial development and FDI and measures ofcentral planning residuals. The 
method we adopted limits our ability to address the improvement in technology and 
management hypothesis. In particular, the fact that inventory investment often has a 
negative value causes troubles. Ideally we intend to search for a relatively 
comprehensive yet most parsimonious set ofindependent explanations to account for 
the overall reduction in output volatility. 
In particular, adhering to Blanchard and Simon (2001) and Jaimovich and Siu 
(2009), we specify the benchmark regression as follows,: 
cT,, =a, +A ^Xs^Ys^-r,Share, +厂_/”/«如^ +r,Employmenf, +r,FinancialDevelopmet, +e, 
where a , is the particular measure ofbusiness cycle volatility for province i at year t, 
Share, is the particular volatile population share measure under consideration, 
Inflation, are different measures of inflation mean and volatility, Employment, are 
different employment measures, Financial Development； are different measures of 
local financial development, Ys include other variables of interest，such as state 
entities share and private share in Total Investment in Fixed Asset. We account for 
unobserved heterogeneity in volatility via the province fixed effect. A is a foll set of 
time dummies. It allows us to control for time-varying factors affecting volatility that 
are common across provinces. Furthermore, we also include a number of other 
provincial-level control variables Xs to account for the provincial heterogeneity 
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missed by the fixed effect^^ and we also control for the variables that are identified in 
the empirical growth literature as being correlated with growth performance across 
countries (Barro, 1991; Easterly et all.，1997); growth and volatility are two sides of 
the same coin. 
We consider this regression to be informative. However, the regression does not 
clearly identify the specific economic mechanisms behind the factors affecting 
output volatility. The panel method enables the identification of the effect of 
different factors through cross-group differences in the extent and timing ofchanges 
in the factors-of-interest. The considerable provincial differences in geography and 
economic development in China make identification possible. Instead of attempting 
to draw a general comparison, we present the statistics indicating that there is 
significant cross-provinces variation in the variables we are considering. The results 
are presented in Table 6. 
Insert Table 6 here] 
Due to the data constraints on Share,, the results are presented in two separate 
sections divided by whether Share, is included in the regression or not. Data on 
Share, are only available for the year 1990，1995, 2000, 2005. As a result, by 
including Share, a significant amount of observations for other variables will be 
lost24. Therefore, a separation based on whether Share, is included is considered the 
more suitable approach. Through this dichotomy, we observe a slight difference in 
the estimation results. The measure of education is only significant when Share, is 
included. Except for this, our results are robust as to whether Share, is included. In 
addition, because we find a break in the national GDP series in 1994 in Section 3, we 
consider that it would be more appropriate to 蘭 our regression in separate sample 
periods. 
^ ^ T h e m a i n r e s u l t s f o r t h i s p a p e r a r e robust as to whether these control variables are 丨；；。=。」。:;!^  
The selection ofthe control variables in this research is similar to that of Guarigia and Poncet(2008). 
^ W e a l o attempted to combine birth rate and death rate to predict the sharevalues betweenthe years 
that we have actual data. The results from the aforementioned practice were found to be qualitatively 
the same as the results presented here. 
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5.3.1. Without Share 
A 7-year rolling window standard deviation and mean are used to measure the 
volatility and level ofinflation. The output volatility is measured as the 7-year rolling 
window standard deviation of filtered log real GDP. The HP filter with smoothing 
parameter 6.25 is adopted suggested by Ravn and Uhlig (2002) for annul data as our 
benchmark method to obtain the volatile component from GDP series. 
First, we explore the hypothesis o f the improvement of the conduct ofmonetary 
policy and the good luck. The improvement of the conduct of monetary policy and 
the good luck both can affect output volatility by affecting inflation volatility. In 
Blanchard and Simon (2001), their panel fixed effect regression with the G7 country 
yields a highly significant coefficient of the inflation volatility on output volatility. 
Such significant relationship ofinflation volatility and output may also be important 
in the context of China. Certainly, the effect of exogenous shocks can be reflected 
directly in output volatility. However, counter-cycle monetary policy may respond to 
exogenous shocks and smooth the effect. As a result, the observed fluctuations in 
output are the combined result of monetary response and the direct effect of 
exogenous shocks. 
We use three different measures of inflation: General Retail Price Index (RPI)， 
General Consumer Price Index (CPI) and Implied GDP Deflator (GDPD). Consistent 
m t h the result in Blanchard and Simon (2001), i fonly include measures ofvolatility 
and mean of inflation in our panel fixed effect regression are included, then the 
coefficients on measures ofinflation volatility are highly significant. The coefficients 
on inflation volatility measures are all significant, whereas the coefficients on 
measures o fmean of inflation are all insignificant whether the regression is run on 
the sample before or after 1994. The results are reported in Table 7. Generally, the 
three measures ofinflation are found to yield the same result, although the magnitude 
of the coefficients and level of significance slightly differ. In addition, as shown in 
subsequent sections, measures ofinflation volatility are always significant across all 
different specifications of the fixed effect panel regressions after 1994. In most of the 
latter regressions, inflation volatility measured by CPI is included. If the 
improvement o f t h e conduct ofmonetary policy and the good luck is considered to 
lead to less inflation and less inflation volatility, then the relationship indicates that 
the two mentioned factors can also lead to less output volatility. 
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To our knowledge, no paper attempting to explain such a strong positive 
statistical relationship between inflation volatility and output volatility found in panel 
regression has yet been published. For one thing, this relationship may still need a lot 
more researches to test its validity and robustness across countries and over times 
before people start to think about the economics reasons behind it. Second, it would 
be more than interesting if the relationship did exist. The relationship contradicts 
with the conventional economics models. The Taylor Curve typically argues that 
there is a trade-offbetween inflation volatility and output volatility. To generate the 
positive relationship, we may need other economics mechanism. Possibly, if high 
inflation volatility leads to more uncertainty in macroeconomic conditions, given that 
economic entities' ability to manage those risks does not improve, the equilibrium 
output would fluctuate more. More rigorous theoretic analysis can therefore extend 
our understanding of the important relationship between inflation and output. 
On the other hand,although the panel method enables us to control for common 
shocks partly and therefore to arrive at an improved estimation, it cannot resolve all 
the potential identification problems. It is actually possible that the causality goes 
from output to inflation volatility through the response of monetary policy. However, 
to address those potential problems is beyond the scope of th is paper. 
[Insert Table 7 here； 
In all o f o u r basic regressions, we include the following control variables: local 
government expenditure over regional GDP as an indicator of government size 
(localexpen_r); regional GDP over national GDP to capture the effect o f t h e size of 
the provincial economy (rgdpratio); total import and export over regional GDP 
(openness), to capture the openness of the economy; and state entities share 
(state_share_i) and private share (private_share_i) in Total Investment in Fixed Asset 
as a measure of the effect of the persistence of central planning and the progress in 
market transition; Regular Secondary School Student Teacher Ratio (rss—ratio) and 
FDI divided by regional nominal GDP (FDI Ratio) are both variables ofinterest and 
control variables because they are included in all specifications. The effect of 
education or, in other words, the effect o fhuman capital accumulation on economic 
growth is considered to be very important. Thus we are curious, if investment in 
education which produces more and better human capital can stimulate economic 
growth, whether it can also reduce the volatility ofeconomic growth at the same time. 
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Inspired by this, we include the education measure rss—ratio. However, the growth 
effect and volatility effect of human capital accumulation may be difficult to 
separated perfectly. As previously mentioned，more volatility may cause less growth; 
more and consistent growth may lead to less volatility. On the other hand, one view 
in the growth literature is that the economic success of China is based upon 
continuous high investment (Young, 1995, etc.). We are curious thus whether the 
investment is made by the state or by the private sector could have an effect on 
output volatility. The state entities share and the private share in Total Investment in 
Fixed Asset provide evidence on this dimension. In all specifications, state entities 
share is not significant, but private share is. In addition, the coefficient of private 
share is negative, and its magnitude is stable across different specifications. The 
result is intuitive as increasing investment made by the private sector is a reflection 
o f t h e diversified decision that lowers systematic risk. However, we believe that our 
results can only be interpreted as suggestive that there might be a role for private 
share on output volatility. More detailed studies are required to identify the channel 
how it really affects output volatility. Column 1 in Table 8 and Table 9 report the 
result of our basic regression. Column 6 reports the results with Newey-West robust 
standard deviation up to lag 2 as a robustness check for possible serial correlation. 
Second, we explore the effect of fmancial development and FDI to output 
volatility reduction. As the importance of a healthy and well-functioning fmancial 
system has been intensively discussed, we couldn't help but wonder whether the 
financial development, aside from its effect on economic growth, could also 
contribute to the reduction of output volatility. Similarly, the increasing FDI in the 
Chinese economic reform is considered critical. China is among the top FDI 
recipients in the world (Prasad and Wei, 2005). FDI not only measures the import of 
capital directly but also the import of technology and the pressure to both the 
government and the domestic firms of structure change and market competition, 
however indirectly. 
Column 2 of Table 8 and Table 9 present the test results of the fmancial 
development hypothesis. We include two different yet commonly used measures of 
financial development: Deposit Ratio measured as the total deposit in fmancial 
institutions divided by regional nominal GDP (deposit_r); Loan Ratio measure as the 
total deposit in financial institutions divided by regional nominal GDP (loan—r). For 
regression after 1994, we also include a measure of the development of stock market, 
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that is the money raised through stock market divided by the regional nominal GDP. 
The included financial development measures are not significant. However, FDI is 
significant throughout nearly all different specifications whether before or after 1994. 
FDI marginally loses its significance i f t he other two financial development measures 
are included in regression after 1994. The results are consistent with Beck, Lundberg, 
and Majnoni (2006) in that financial intermediaries have no overall effect on growth 
volatility. They measure the financial intermediaries by private credit, which is 
claims on nonfinancial private sector by financial institutions as share of GDP. This 
measure is different but is comparable with the Deposit Ratio and Loan Ratio used 
by us. 
Third, the gradual yet significant change in the labor force structure and 
population structure of an economy in China may play a non-negligible role in the 
reduction of overall output volatility. The paper by Jaimovich and Siu (2009) is the 
first to establish a convincing relationship between demographics and 
macroeconomic volatility. It inspired us to look into the employment and population 
variables. We will discuss more in details the comparison of our specification and 
that of Jaimovich and Siu (2009) later. We are interested in whether we could fmd 
similar evidence that the employment measure and labor force structure affect output 
volatility in China. We will have a more Jaimovich and Siu (2009) manner 
specification in Section 5.3.2, In this section, we include three different measures of 
employment and labor force structure to test the hypothesis that measured labor force 
structures can affect output volatility. These measures are Primary Employment 
(pri_emp_r), State-owned Enterprise (SOE) employment (SOE_Employment_Ratio) 
and—Urban Employment (Urban—Employment—Ratio) ratios defined as the relative 
employment divided by total employment. In the results presented in Column 4 to 6 
in Table 8 and Table 9, we find that all of our employment measures are not 
significant in both sample periods. The fact that Primary Employment is not 
significant agrees with the result obtained in our test of compositional changes. The 
changes in the relative importance of the three industries can't explain the overall 
trend of output volatility nor do their employment counterpart. We considered SOE 
employment to play a role because we observed much more fluctuations in the 
central planning era. To some extent, the SOE employment share in total 
employment is a measure of the persistent influence of the central planning in 
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employment. The urban employment and rural employment^^ can slightly reflect the 
trend ofurbanization. However, those factors seem to be statistically unimportant in 
our result. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
5.3.2. With Share 
Jaimovich and Siu (2009) find that the volatile share defined as the fraction of 
the 15-64-year-old labor force population accounted for by those 15-29 and 60-64 
accounts for about one-fifth to one-third o f t h e output volatility ^ d e r a t i o n in the US 
during 1978-1999. To establish the relationship between demographics and 
macroeconomic volatility, they first document the important differences in the 
responsiveness of labor market activity to the business cycle for individuals of 
different ages. They show that the cyclical volatility ofmarket work is U-shaped as a 
foiction of age for all G7 countries and they argue that it is，in fact, an empirical 
regularity. They then identify the effect of workforce age composition on business 
cycle volatility by regressing different measures of business cycle volatility on the 
volatile share using panel-data methods. In their model, population volatile share and 
lagged birth rate are later used to instrument the labor force volatile share to deal 
with the potential endogeneity problems. 
To test whether a similar mechanism also applies to China, the empirical 
regularity that cyclical volatility of market work is U-shaped as a function of age 
should first be tested. However, China does not have the data for us to check whether 
this found empirical regularity is true or not. On the one hand, we think that the 
young experiencing much greater volatility of employment and hours worked than 
the prime-aged over the business cycle is intuitive; those closer to retirement 
experience volatility somewhere in between. Thus, despite the lack of evidence, we 
tend to believe this to be true for China. On the other hand, rather than doing nothing, 
we take an ad-hoc method of inference. Supposing we find volatile share to be 
significant in the regression, it at least is suggestive of the existence o f the non-tested 
age heterogeneous employment responsiveness to business cycle volatility in China. 
25 We do not include rural employment in the regression because ofperfect collinearity. 
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otherwise, there must be other undiscovered mechanism through which the volatile 
share can contribute to the business cycle volatility. 
In fact, China does not even report employment by age at the provincial level. 
Thus, in our specification, we directly put volatile population share in our regression. 
We argue that our specification mainly measures the same thing as in Jaimovich and 
Siu (2009) in concept. Although in Jaimovich and Siu (2009)，the evidences that 
young and elder people experience more volatility are convincing, this empirical 
regularity is a black-box in which we do not know what is happening or has 
happened inside. For the US and Japan, they have annual series o f p e r capita hours 
worked and they only have employment data for the rest of G7 countries. They show 
that the volatility of detrended cyclical series of either hours worked or employment 
is U-shaped as a ftinction ofage. 
We contend two things: first, the details in the black-box matter when we 
interpret the results; second, their employment volatility underestimates the 
fluctuation in the labor force participation volatility. We need a simple yet subtle 
analysis to explain these two arguments. Consider any individual at age j. First she 
will make the decision ofwhether to join the labor market or not. Second, when she 
is in the labor market, she faces the risk of being unemployed. As long as she is 
willing to work, she is counted as labor force population. If she is employed, she will 
be counted in the employment data and if she is unemployed she will be counted in 
the unemployment data. Let us call the fluctuation in the individuals’ first step 
decision labor f o r c e participation volatility; Let us call the volatility people face in 
the second step employment volatility. Without considering the statistical inaccuracy 
and measurement error, the only difference between labor force population and 
population is the number ofpeople who voluntarily decide not to work^^ When the 
economy fluctuates, the volatility that we observe in employment data, at least 
theoretically, should be the results from the two-steps decisions. The relative 
importance o f t h e two-steps decision is unknown. What we know is that the relative 
importance does vary for population of different ages and sexes. For instance， 
according to Fullerton (1999), the labor force participation rate for prime-aged men 
is always very high and does not change much even for, say, fifty years in the US. 
During the same period, the labor force participation rate for women aged 25-34 
26 We only consider the age between 15-64. We avoided analyzing the decision related to retirement 
and first entrance into labor market for teenagers. 
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changes dramatically. However, the relative importance of the two possible sources 
of variation has important implications on the choice of how to measure volatile 
share. I f w e consider the first decision to be less important than the second decision, 
then we should expect the difference between measured volatile share by labor force 
data and population data to be small I f w e consider the first decision to be important, 
then labor force share may underestimate the size of the volatile age group by 
ignoring the people who are currently not in the labor force but could possibly decide 
to look for jobs later on, for instance, when the economic situation is better or when 
their family economic conditions worsen. Let us look at this alternatively. Labor 
force volatile share measures the share ofpeople who are currently in the labor force 
and experience more employment volatility. On the other hand, population force 
volatile share potentially measures the share of people who could experience either 
more labor force participation volatility or more employment volatility or both. 
In this regard, we consider using volatile population share to produce a similar 
even i f no t identical result as using volatile labor force share. The labor force share, 
although it accurately measures the share of people who face the fluctuation of 
employment and unemployment, does less good in capturing the share ofpeople who 
face more potential fluctuations in labor force participation. 
On the other hand, using volatile population share is less subjected to the 
endogeneity issue because the contemporary population is largely determined by the 
fertility decision at least 15 years ago, which is unlikely to be correlated with the 
contemporary macroeconomic environment and thus those macroeconomic variables. 
Therefore our regression should be able to identify the true effect of volatile people 
share on output volatility. Figure 12 presents a graph of the national level volatile 
share together with the natural population growth rate lagged by 15 years. There is a 
clear downward trend for volatile share. The one-child policy, which was strictly 
implemented from the early 1980s is likely to be one of the most important reasons 
behind the declining trend. The aging of the population is another possible reason. As 
the observation of Share, in between 1990 and 1995 is absent, regression can only 
be run with Share, after 1994. The basic results are summarized in Table 10. In 
Column 1 of Table 10 reports the basic regression. Except for the inclusion of 
Share,, the specification is the same as that in Section 5.3.1. Inflation volatility, 
share and FDI are significant at 5% and the coefficients are all positive. The 
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coefficient on private share is still significant and negative, but the magnitude 
significantly increases. 
Insert Table lOhere； 
In Column 2 to 3, we include different measures of financial development and 
FDI. Deposit Ratio contributes negatively to the output volatility, whereas the 
contribution of Loan Ratio is just opposite. Other than this, the other results remain 
unchanged compared with those obtained in the previous section. The measure o f the 
stock market development enters insignificantly into the regression. Inflation 
volatility, share, private share in Total Fixed Investment and FDI are consistently 
significant. The coefficients o f the mentioned factors are nearly the same as those in 
Column 1. 
In Column 4 to 6 ofTable 10 the different measures of employment are included 
to determine how these employment measures can affect the output volatility. By 
putting Share, and different employment measure into the regression together, 
Share, is more important in regarding to measure the impact of the labor force 
structure and employment on the volatility ofoutput than all the other measures that 
considered. All the employment measures other than Share, enter insignificantly 
into the regression. The main difference in the regression with Share, from without 
Share., is that rss ratio becomes significant. 11 — 
Evidence from combining the results in the previous subsection shows that 
inflation volatility, volatile share, private share in Total Fixed Investment and FDI 
are all important. As a final step, we test the robustness of these significant factors to 
different inflation measures. The results are presented in Table 11. Inflation volatility, 
volatile share, private share in Total Fixed Investment and FDI are robust to different 
inflation measures. Inflation volatility, volatile share, and FDI are significant in all 
specifications. Private share in Total Fixed Investment loses significance in Column 
1 but only at a marginal level. The p-value is 10.2%. In these three specifications, 
human capital measures regain its significance. Due to the data limitation on Share, ’ 
there are only three years ofobservations in regression after 1994. Thus, we also test 
whether adding back 1990 would significantly affect the results. The results are 
reported in Table 12. 
[Insert Table 11 here] 
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[Insert Table 12 here] 
5.3.3. Interpretation of the Regression Result 
First, making inference at the national level based on the coefficient estimates 
obtained from the provincial level panel regression is problematic. Thus, we make 
inference at the provincial level instead. Let us take Share.^ for example. Table 13 
shows the detailed descriptive statistics of output volatility. The mean of the output 
volatility variable is 0.038 in 1995 and 0.015 in 2005. The mean of Share, is 0.45 in 
1995 and 0,36 in 2005. I f w e use the estimated coefficient on Share^^ in Column 1 of 
Table 10, 0.164，then the change in Share, will result in the reduction of output 
volatility by 0.015. Therefore, the variation in Share^^ alone can explain about 64% 
of the variation in output volatility. A similar practice is done for the entire 
significant factor in Column 1 of Table 10, the variations account for 108% o f t h e 
variation in output volatility. 
[Insert Table 13 here； 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we document the dramatic two-phase moderation in output 
volatility in China from 1952-2009. We show that China's output volatility measured 
by the standard deviation of real gross domestic product (GDP) growth over the 
specified rolling windows exhibit an unambiguous declining trend. The magnitude of 
the reduction in China is comparable with the "Great Moderation" in most 
industrialized economies. We find that the output volatility experiences the sharpest 
decline when transforming from a central economy to a market economy. We explain 
why this sharpest decline in output volatility occurred in 1978. The strong central 
government control imposes systematic risk on the economy. Policy errors, 
transform into large drops in the output of all provinces. When the government 
finally realizes their errors, the correction of these errors will create, on the opposite, 
a significant rebound in output of all provinces. This process, therefore, resulted in 
the high output volatility at the national level during the central planning era. By 
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deviating away from central planning, the decrease in provincial co-movement, thus, 
reduces the output volatility. 
In the latter part o f the paper, we use 29 provinces over 27 years' panel to study 
the relationship between different factors and output volatility. We study at least five 
sets of factors that may potentially affect the output volatility. We find that inflation 
volatility, FDI, private share in Total Fixed Investment and volatile population share 
consistently enter significantly into our regression. The strong positive relationship 
between volatile population share and output volatility survive different robustness 
checks. In addition, it is unlikely that volatile population share would be correlated 
with the output volatility aside from the channel that young and elderly people 
experience more volatility in the labor market. As a consequence, the causality 
should go from volatile population share to output volatility. FDI and private share in 
Total Fixed Investment which are important in the China's context, also contribute in 
explaining the reduction in output volatility. 
On the other hand, the strong positive relationship between inflation volatility 
and output volatility is interesting even though the concern about endogeneity makes 
drawing any conclusion about causality on both sides difficult. First, the positive 
relationship provides indirect evidence supporting the hypothesis o f the improvement 
of the conduct of monetary policy and the good luck hypothesis, given that the 
improvement of the conduct of monetary policy and the good luck both will lead to 
less inflation and inflation volatility. Second, as in the standard economic models, 
monetary policymakers can reduce the volatility of inflation in the long run only by 
allowing greater volatility in output growth (Bemanke, 2004). Although the positive 
relationship in regressions does not produce a deterministic conclusion, it at least 
suggests that there is something that obscured the trade-off between volatility in 
output and volatility in inflation as predicted by the theoretic model. Blanchard and 
Simon (2001) and Jaimovich and Siu (2009) also find the same significant positive 
relationship between output volatility and inflation volatility in G7 countries. 
In the end, although evidences of the striking moderation in output fluctuation in 
China during the past half century and the past twenty to thirty years are clear, the 
explanations for this moderation are still not complete. We provide one possible 
explanation for the sudden drop in the 1970s, which we think play a critical role. But 
there might be other explanations. We also explore some possible factors affecting 
the continuous moderation in output volatility in China after 1978. Our research, 
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therefore, should only be considered as a first step. More researches employing better 
and more rigorous econometric models or using new available dataset that go beyond 
what we have addressed above are, needless to say, in high demand in order to better 
understand the moderation in China. At the same time, researches about China's 
moderation can also be helpfUl in understanding of the more general "Great 
Moderation". 
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Figure 10 
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Figure 10 
Roffing Window Estimate Mean Growth Rate 
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Figure 10 
Change ofSectoral Share in China 1952-2009 
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Figure 10 
Volatility ofPrimary, Secondary and Tertiary Sector Growth 
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Figure 12 
National Population Volatile Share and Lagged Natural Growth Rate 
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Table 11 
Changes in Output Volatility; Different Detrending Methods 
standard Deviation Standard Deviation : “ 
1955-1977 1978-2006 Percentage Chanae 1978-1994 1995-2006 Percentage Change 
H ^ 0 : ^ n 7 ^ ~ ~ 0 3 ^ -0.724425371 ~ " " 0 ^ 7 7 8 3 0.023631 ^374559987 
HP6.25 0.083629 0.018712 -0.776249865 0.02387 0.007904 -^ =二二二^ 
BP 0 07913 0.017232 -0.782231771 0.021908 0.007579 -0.654053314 
LoqD 0 109927 0.02562 -0.76693624 0.032352 0.01148 - 0 . 6 4 5 1 5 3 3 1 4 _ 
Notes: each row uses different detrending methods. HP100: HP-filter with parameter 100 for annual senes; HP6.25: 
HP-filter with parameter 6.25 for annual series; BP: Baxter-King filter with 2-8 years cycle periods; Log D: log 
difference. 
Table 2 
Chow Breakpoint Test: 1980 1994 
Null Hypothesis: No breaks at specified breakpoints 
日叫3丨丨0[1 Sample: 1953 2008 
F-statistic 2.629912 Prob. F(4,50) 0.0462 
Log likelihood ratio 10.69293 Prob. Chi-Square(4 0.0302 
Wald Statistic 10.57919 Prob. Chi-Square(4) 0.0317 
Table 3 
Volatility of Growth in Real GDP and Its Components 
^^  standard D e v i a t i ~ Standard Deviation 
iQ^ -^iQ77iQ7R-PnnR Percentage Change 1978-1994 1995-2008 Percentage Change 
RealGDP(expendlture) 二 二 0.042599 -0.8^126658^ 0 . 0 腳 0.033016 - 0 . 3 4 6 W 
ConsumerSpending -0.168581555 0.044964 0.01866 -0.585001334 
=vSe^=ent 0：?^7928 0.065195 -0.527325851 0.080632 0.043552 -0.45986705 
lnvest^=t 0 278085 0.099585 -0.64189007 0.128267 0.053181 -0.585388292 
==Pl ta l r.7'303 0.355707 -n.R94552313 0.39«9iq n.11B17 0.254115468 
r n n , . 、 0 104825 0 02816 -0.731361793 0.035373 0.014926 -0.578039748 
p- l ' ryTnduT；'^ o S ? 0^028164 -0.591867492 0.035348 0.012682 -0.641224397 
Secondarylndustry -0.76263771 0.059636 0.020597 -0.65462137 
=nUsSi:tian 0：251804 0.074831 -0.702820448 0.095295 0.035417 -0.628343565 
T = = : p o s t & T e j _ _ i c a t i o n 0.170273 0.03089 -0.818585448 0.035983 0.023355 = = 
L : a l e Retail & CatAHnn Trade 0 1?0議 0.083541 -0.309058879__0,110451 0.015487 -0.859783977 
P^r-C^pitalGDP 0.096445 0.027951 -0.710187153 0.035398 0.019393__-0.452144189 
Table 4 
The Effect of Changing Sectoral Composition on the Variance of GDP 
Counterfactual Exercise 一 —.， ^ 
Standard Deviation Standard Deviation 
1QR.^ .1Q77 1978-2009 Percentage Change 1978-1994 1995-2009 Percentage Change 
GDP(3Ctual) 0.104825 0.027326 -0.739317911 ~~0.035373 0.014623 ^6605603 
GDP(1978 nominalshare) 0.119165 0.027419 -0.769907271 0.034911 0-013565 -oOf^ lglgAdOSZ 
G ^ 1 9 7 8 real share) 0.156344 0.035467 -0.773147674 0.045725 0.016921 -0.629939858 
rnPMQQ4 nominal shared 0 124122 0.029176 -0.764940945 0.037474 0.013741 -0.633319101 
二 「 二 二 = 二 ） n ' n ' 4 5 3 。.。4627 -0 .771453127__0-060144 0 . 0 2 1 3 2 5 _ : 0 , M ^ _ 
50 
Table 11 
Estimation of X before and after 1978 
Panel A 
Provinces i^T ~""Ai P ^ ^ ^ s 5Jf Ai Provinces ^ )i 
Anhui -0.3237 0.6143* Henan -0.8747** 1.0996*** Q.ngha. _ = 1,^31 
(0 4478) (0 0562) (0.0495) (0.0071) (0.0122) (0.0001) 
Beijing -1.0638丄 1.4075*** Hubei -0.9953*** 1.0693*** Shaanxi =二了 1.2444**; 
(0 0022) (0 0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0004) (0.0000) 
Fujian -0.7583- 0.8655*** Hunan -0.8256** 0.9467*** Shandong =二* 0.8439** 
(0.0156) (0.0018) (0.0252) (0.0056) i°.°J®lL . ^ o S 
Gansu -1.1641*** 1.3751*** lnnerMongolia-1.1347*** 1.2789*** Shanghai _^;f=4 1 f 05 
(0 0000) (0 0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0015) (0.0000) 
Guangdong ^1213^^ 二 - g s u -0.3504* 0.5624*:* Shanxi 二 ； 二 ： 
(0.5331) (0.0009) (0-0864) (aOOO) T 5 i 1 1425*-
Guangxi -0.2888 0.3313** Jiangxi -0.2204 0.3585- T.anj.n _ = ^ - ^ f ^ 
mi617^ (0 0412) (0.2805) (0.0451 (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Guizhou - 1 ^ * M ^ 1 ^ ' i j , , i l322-M.2599*- Xinjiang -？二町/二。。?；；; 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0^10^1 n ^ Z T l 
Hebei . U 6 1 - M . 1 1 1 8 * - Liaoning -1.7004*** 1.9532*** Yunnan -0J707 0.6521 
(0.0090) (0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0000) ^ ) ( 0 ^ ) 
Heilongjiang -1.2136*** 1.2832*** Ningxia - 0 . 8 5 5 � 1 . 0 3 1 2 - Zhej.ang _ = 0.5473 
(0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.4478) (0.0002) 
Panel B ^ • _ 
- 7 - 二1 ^7***=r i^^ 679**;'f ; = s :lQ5i4***;W** 
A - i " S ) 7o031) ? _ ) ( , ) . = L i ( = l 
_ - 1 ( c S * 1 ( = ; H _ - ^ ; - S - , - - ' S ) \ 0 ^ ) 
F _ r r * ^ * o " ^ ^ Hunan i _ * * 0.9752*** Shandong - 二 。 ( = 
m n027^ (0 0000) (0.0254) (0.0009 (0.0032) (0.0000) 
Gansu -jOoOgO/elfs=)* | _ M o _ i a - ; 4 * i * 1 .3403: Shanghai _ = o 5 : ; * 1 ( = * 
� d = ) 0 ( = ) * J _ s u = = � ; ? ) S _ i _ = ! * i ( O 2 - ) * 
Ouangdong - . 2 0. 358 J i — °,；；,,) (0.0000) 二 1 二 
G - i - 二 ) - ^ ; 一 - 二 )。 (二 ; T ' - _ 二 ) \ o Z j ) 
G - S : . - r ( = ; _ - 二 ； 。 ( ； 
HPhh = 1 9 丄 1 1329 °- Liaoning - .5679丄 2:0992*** Yunnan -0.4573*** 0.6699** 
1 o O o L (00000) (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0033) (0.0000 
U .I ".nn f ; ^ R i r - 1 3 6 2 5 - Ninqxia -0.8726^ 1.1022-* Zhejiang -0.0266 0.6752*** 
H e , _ i a n g - = o ) ^ - 3 ^ ^ , — ⑴誦）（0.0) ⑴漏）(0-00) 
t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01,** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 11 
S u m m a r y Statistics o f K e y Variables by Provinces 
, ‘Mp.fm Std. Dev. 
province ~ ^ ~ ； ； ； ^ ~ v G D P FDI_ratio Share vinf2 vGDP FDI_ratio 
anhui 0.435 0.056 0.030 0.010 0.076 0.029 0.014 0,009 
beijing 0.418 0.052 0.02123 0.047 0.061 0.022 0,0 0.023 
fuiian 0.461 0.062 0.023919 0.060 0.069 0.032 0.014 0.055 
ginsu 0.443 0.055 0.033372 0.003 0.076 0.026 0.006 0.003 
guangdong 0.481 0.068 0.027888 0.063 0.041 0.039 0.018 0.047 
quanqxi 0 457 0.064 0.018773 0.017 0.061 0.033 0.008 0,017 
fufzho 0.456 0.055 0.022505 0.003 0.070 0.027 0.011 0-002 
h a r n 0.474 0.071 0.048374 0.077 0.052 0.039 0.032 0.072 
^ebei 0 423 0.055 0.02189 0.011 0.056 0.026 0,008 0.009 
heHonqii 0423 0.045 0.016329 0.010 0.095 0.020 0.004 0.009 
h = n 0.438 0.058 0.030067 0.007 0,068 0.028 0.013 0.005 
h'bei 0 420 0.055 0.022471 0.018 0.087 0.027 0.010 0.0 1 
h = n 0425 0.061 0.022413 0.013 0.073 0.029 0.015 0.010 
nnermong 0.438 0.048 0.032869 0.008 0-089 0.026 0.017 . 
iianasu 0 406 0.054 0.033008 0.040 0.072 0.026 0.021 0.034 
= n = ^ 4 7 0.059 0,025774 0.019 0.086 0.033 0.009 0.0 8 
Hn^ 0417 0.046 0.034108 0.011 0.090 0.021 0.017 0.010 
= _ 0 396 0.052 0.035127 。.028 0.089 0.028 0.016 0.022 
^ ^ 0 477 0.046 0.017067 0.007 0.065 0.023 0.008 0.008 
= f h a i 0 4 8 0.047 0.02504 0.011 0.073 0.021 0.012 0.015 
= a a = 0426 0,055 0.02394 0.014 0.076 0.029 0.010 0.008 
= = n g o f o 9 0.050 0.023625 0.024 0.073 0.025 0.011 . 
shanqhai 0.384 0.050 0.025972 0.050 0.059 0.026 0.010 0.U41 
s = r 0.431 0.056 0.035307 0.007 0.075 0.027 0.005 0.006 
= n 0.409 0.057 0.019578 0.007 0.0:7 0.029 • . 
, . . . n Ann n n4ft 0 021192 0 054 0.062 0.024 U.UUy U.uoi 
二 48 04 0 02968 0:002 0.053 0.026 0.008 0.002 
_ g n/7Q nnRR n n99Q53 0 005 0.064 0.025 0.010 0.005 
y ; = g 0 : = 0：03496? 0,^21 0,075 0.031 0.018 0.017 
Total 0.436 0.055 0.026867 0.023 2 ^ 0 : 2 ^ _ 2 ： ^ — — ^ : ^ ^ 
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Table 11 
Fixed Effect Regression: Inflation 
— W) ~ 
RPI CPI GDPD 
VARIABLES Y ^ ^ ^ 






• f 2 ( 0 . 1 6 3 ) 
minf9 0.408 





PmstEint -0.0268 -0.0232 0.0223** 
Constant (0.0486) (0.0374) (0.00935) 
909 206 232 
Observations 以 _。7。 n 糊 。 , 0 318 0.272 u *^ ud 
R-squared u.oio — 
Panel B: After 1994 — • 
7infT Q.523** 
( 0 . 2 4 1 ) 
minf1 00291 
(0.107) 
. , . 0.491* 
vinf2 (0.253) 






^ , + 0 00461 0.00472 0.0116*** 
Constant (0.00574) (0.00690) (0.00308) 
0 7 7 377 377 
Observations 。'‘ 一 … ^ cvn 
n . 0 600 0.591 0.570 
R-squared � = 29 29 
Number of orovinces ^^ 
Notes- RPI^General Retail Pnce Index; CPI-General Consumer Pnce Index; GDFD=lmplied u u . ueflator vGDP is 
= a r r J h n g window standard d e — o n of the volatile log real GDP senes HP filter filtered wi thp^ameter 6.25 
v i J i s t ^ e a r rollmg ^ d o w standard deviation ofRPI ; mmH is 7-year rollmg window mean ofRPI ; vmf2 is 7-year 
: : i w i n d o : s t a n d a r d deviation ofCPI; n.mf2 is 7-year rolHng window mean ofCPI ; vmf3 is 7-year rolhng window 
standard deviation o fGDPD; minf3 is 7-year rollmg window mean ofGDPD. 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Fixed Effect Regression All Factors After 1994 
— l2) f^ 
RPI CPI GDPD 





. „ 0.457** 
vinf2 (0,201) 






」 + . -0 476 -0.688 -0.292 
rgdPratio (二乃 (0.471) (0.411) 
.0 00130 -0.00262 0.000890 
openness (oo0689) (0.00746) (0.00804) 
, ^ .0 0104 -0.00442 -0.0285** 
state—sharej (冗； (0.0147) (0.0116) 
. , ^ .0 0708 -0.0808* _0.103* 
pr.vate_share_i (二； (0.0437) (0.0517) 
‘. 0 000818*** 0.000686** 0.000949** 
rssjatio (0 000199) (0.000260) (0.000355) 
_0 0234 -0.0600 -0.00756 
localexpen—r (0 0841) (0.0853) (0-0949) 
0 117- 0.164** 0.152** 
share (0：0552) (0.0660) (0.0709) 
、0 161** 0.174** 0 .236 -
F D I - _ (0'.0609) (0.0654) (0.0563) 
^ , + -0 0173 -0.0192 -0.0264 
Constant (oQ265) (0.0266) (0.0220) 
72 72 72 
Observations o.879 0.879 
R-squared ^' 29 ^ 
Number of provinces — — 
-;-:^a:^r^^^^ 
二 = - 1 ; 广 = 二 二 二 = 二 = 二 二 
_ 0 is 7-year ro&ngwinde=oC = n r ^ r del^^ Teacher Ratio; openess measured as total im_ and export 
= r g ^ i n G ^ D I ， i D ; ^ - d asThe FDI div_ by regional n o _ l GDP; sha.def.ned as the f=on ofthe 
l yg -o d populatio-n accounted for by those 15-29 and 60-64; rgdpraUo measured as reg|onal GDP over na i°na= ’ 
tate share i m L u r e d as the state entities share m Total Investment in F.xed Asset; pnvate_share_ . measured as the pnva te share m 
TotarinvesTment in Fixed Asset; localexpen_r measured the local government expenditure over regional GDP. 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Descriptive Statistics for vGDP 
‘ Mean STD Min Max 
vGDP 0.026867 0.014846 0.004744 0.09715 
percentiles ^ ^ ^ ^ 
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